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Less is More, or Not? On the Interplay between Bundles of Slack Resources, 
Firm Performance and Firm Survival 
 
ABSTRACT Although a significant body of research has investigated the independent effects of 
distinct types of slack resources, current theoretical and empirical work does not sufficiently 
clarify how bundles of slack resources affect firm outcomes. Drawing on the resource constraints 
literature and the slack literature, we investigate how distinct bundles of financial and human 
resource (HR) slack influence firm performance and survival. Using a sample of 4,715 European 
information and communication technology (ICT) firms, we show that neither parallel resource 
abundance (having slack in financial and human resources) nor parallel resource constraints 
(lacking slack in financial and human resources) are optimal for firm performance and survival. 
However, firms with selective constraints that combine slack in financial resources with 
constraints in human resources exhibit superior performance without decreased survival 
prospects. Taken together, this study extends current research by providing a more nuanced view 
of the relationships between slack resources, firm performance and firm survival. 
 
Keywords: entrepreneurship, performance, resource bundles, resource constraints, slack 
resources, survival 
 
INTRODUCTION 
How do slack resources―those resources that firms possess in excess of resource demands from 
current business―affect firm performance? Scholars have long studied this question, but mixed 
findings have emerged (for reviews, see Daniel et al., 2004; Tan and Peng, 2003). In the classic 
resource-based view (RBV), having more resources is often considered better than having fewer 
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resources (Barney, 1991; Cooper et al., 1994). Organization theorists further argue that slack 
buffers firms from environmental jolts and fosters strategic behavior, thereby enhancing 
performance (Bromiley, 1991; Cyert and March, 1963; Greenley and Oktemgil, 1998; Singh, 
1986; Thompson, 1967). However, others argue that there are costs associated with large 
resource endowments, such as core rigidities and reduced experimentation (Mosakowski, 2002). 
Resource constraints theorists assert that firms with fewer resources leverage their resources 
more efficiently and, as a result, can survive and even flourish despite experiencing resource 
constraints (Baker and Nelson, 2005; Starr and MacMillan, 1990). 
Researchers have sought to reconcile these conflicting perspectives on the performance 
effects of slack in at least two ways. First, scholars have argued that the performance effect of 
one type of slack depends on the level of that type of slack. Specifically, increasing slack levels 
have a positive effect on performance, but this effect gradually diminishes with increasing slack 
levels and eventually becomes negative at high levels, resulting in an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between slack and performance (Bourgeois, 1981; George, 2005; Mousa and Reed, 
2013; Nohria and Gulati, 1996; Sharfman et al., 1988; Tan and Peng, 2003). Second, scholars 
have focused on contingent factors that moderate the slack-performance relationship. 
Specifically, studies have shown how industry conditions (Bradley et al., 2011a; George, 2005; 
Lecuona and Reitzig, 2014; Verbeke and Yuan, 2013) and firm characteristics (George, 2005; 
Mishina et al., 2004; Vanacker et al., 2013) impact the performance effects of slack. 
 We take a different approach and ask the following research questions: (a) how do distinct 
bundles of financial (i.e., excess cash) and HR slack (i.e., excess employees on the payroll)
 
influence firm performance and survival, and (b) are different bundles optimal for new firms 
(defined here as firms that have been in existence for eight years or less) and later-stage firms? 
Theoretically, our approach is consistent with the view of resource-based theorists (Barney, 1991; 
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Mosakowski, 2002; Wernerfelt, 1984), who argue that firm performance is dependent on the 
characteristics of a firm‘s bundle of resources rather than its individual resources. Because 
enhancing (i.e., one resource magnifies the impact of another resource) and suppressing (i.e., one 
resource diminishes the impact of another resource) relationships may exist between resources 
(Black and Boal, 1994), slack in one type of resource may benefit or harm performance, 
depending on the level of other types of resource slack. Hence, there is a need to consider the 
performance effects of distinct bundles of slack resources. 
Empirical evidence on the extent to which bundles of slack resources affect firm 
outcomes is scarce because prior research has focused on the independent effects of one (Bradley 
et al., 2011a,b; George, 2005; Greve, 2003; Lecuona and Reitzig, 2014; Love and Nohria, 2005; 
Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2010; Natividad, 2013) or multiple types of slack (Mishina et al., 2004; 
Mousa and Reed, 2013; Vanacker et al., 2013; Verbeke and Yuan, 2013; Voss et al., 2008). Some 
recent exploratory studies have focused on the impact of resource bundles on firm performance. 
Gruber et al. (2010), for instance, study how bundles of resources and capabilities are configured 
in the sales and distribution function and determine how these bundles are related to performance, 
whereas Mousa et al. (2013) show that initial public offerings (IPOs) with low slack 
configurations exhibit higher performance than do IPOs with high slack configurations. However, 
these studies have not theorized exactly which bundles of financial and HR slack contribute most 
to firm performance and survival. Moreover, although scholars have suggested that the value of 
resource bundles changes as firms develop (Sirmon et al., 2011), these cross-sectional studies do 
not address how distinct bundles of slack resources affect firm performance as firms age. 
In this paper, we develop a conceptual framework for the relationship between distinct 
bundles of slack resources, firm performance and firm survival and for the temporal nature of 
these relationships. To test our model, we use a sample of 4,715 European ICT firms. By our 
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focusing on one industry, the unobserved heterogeneity among firms resulting from variance in 
industry conditions is reduced. In addition, the ICT industry is a typical example of a high-
velocity environment with constantly changing demand, competition and technology (Wirtz et 
al., 2007). In such an environment, slack resources are thought to be especially important because 
they provide the necessary means for discovering and exploiting new strategic options, which is 
essential for maintaining alignment with the rapidly changing environment (Greenley and 
Oktemgil, 1998).  
In addition to contributing to the slack literature, this study also contributes to a broader 
resource-based literature. Our study creates a bridge between classic resource-based theory (i.e., 
―more is better‖ perspective) and the resource constraints literature (i.e., ―less is more‖ 
perspective). We show how a combination of the two perspectives where firms combine slack in 
unabsorbed (financial) resources with constraints in absorbed (human) resources leads to superior 
performance without hampering firm survival. By studying bundles of slack resources and 
showing how particular bundles lead to performance advantages while others lead to performance 
disadvantages, we also provide essential extensions that cross-validate the theoretical value of 
resource-based theories (e.g., Armstrong and Shimizu, 2007; Priem and Butler, 2001). 
 
THEORY 
Bundles of Slack Resources 
Resource-based theories depict firms as heterogeneous bundles of resources (Barney, 1991; 
Mosakowski, 2002; Wernerfelt, 1984) and stress the importance of slack resources (or lack 
thereof) rather than the absolute amount of resources possessed by firms (Mishina et al., 2004; 
Penrose, 1959). In the classic RBV, particular attention has been devoted to the characteristics of 
resources that lead to competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). It is argued that firms with ―more 
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valuable resources than other firms‖ will exhibit superior performance (Peteraf and Barney, 2003, 
p. 317, emphasis added). Resource constraints theorists, however, argue that value can be 
destroyed by adding more resources to a firm‘s resource pool (Mosakowski, 2002). Especially in 
an entrepreneurial setting, resource constraints drive entrepreneurs to work more efficiently and 
foster entrepreneurial ingenuity, which ultimately benefits a firm‘s performance and survival 
prospects (Baker and Nelson, 2005). 
Resource slack and resource constraints are generally depicted as two extremes on a 
continuum of possible resource positions (Dolmans et al., 2014; George, 2005). At one end of 
this continuum, firms accumulate slack when the resources available exceed those needed for the 
basic operations of the firm; at the other end of the continuum, constraints arise when fewer 
resources are available than needed. Empirically, prior research largely views this continuum as 
one-dimensional in nature (i.e., firms either have slack resources or are resource constrained) 
based on the specific type of resource being studied, typically financial resources (see, for 
instance, George, 2005). However, when firms are conceived as bundles of resources, they may 
for instance combine constraints in one type of resource with slack in other types of resources. 
Hence, the classic RBV and resource constraints literatures are not necessarily incongruent, but 
the question becomes which combinations of resource slack and resource constraints are better 
for firm performance and survival. 
We focus on bundles of slack or constraints in two resources, namely, financial and 
human resources. Empirically, these resources are the most frequently examined and are found to 
be the most clearly related to firm emergence and development (Cooper et al., 1994; Gilbert et 
al., 2006). Theoretically, moreover, financial and HR slack lie at opposing ends of a continuum, 
representing the extent to which slack resources are redeployable elsewhere (Singh, 1986; Tan 
and Peng, 2003). Financial (available) slack represents unabsorbed slack, which consists of 
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resources that are currently uncommitted and are readily available for redeployment within a 
firm, such as excess cash (Voss et al., 2008). HR slack represents absorbed slack, which consists 
of resources that are highly idiosyncratic to context and more difficult to redeploy, such as an 
excess of employees on the payroll (Mishina et al., 2004).  
Figure 1 summarizes the four distinct bundles of slack resources that exist when 
considering both financial and HR slack. First, some firms may experience parallel resource 
abundance, i.e., having both financial and HR slack (quadrant I). Other firms may experience 
parallel resource constraints, i.e., lacking both financial and HR slack (quadrant IV). Third, firms 
may also be characterized by a pattern of selective resource constraints, which means that they 
are constrained in one resource but have slack in another. Two distinct types of selective resource 
constraints exist in our study: selective resource constraints in human resources (quadrant II), 
which implies that firms combine slack in financial resources with constraints in human resources 
and selective resource constraints in financial resources (quadrant III), which implies that firms 
combine HR slack with constraints in financial resources. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 Entrepreneurial firms, such as those we study, are likely to be found in any of the four 
quadrants identified in Figure 1. This is true for at least two reasons. First, prior research shows 
how entrepreneurial firms differ significantly in their early resource endowments (Heirman and 
Clarysse, 2007; Shane and Stuart, 2002). Some entrepreneurial firms may have accumulated 
slack from their early operations and initial stock of capital (Fichman and Levinthal, 1991), 
whereas others are more constrained. Second, extant research suggests that firms with slack in 
one type of resource do not necessarily have slack in other types of resources; in other words, 
empirically, correlations between different types of slack are generally low (Mishina et al., 2004; 
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Voss et al., 2008). Below, we develop our hypotheses, which relate to how these distinct bundles 
of slack resources affect firm performance and survival. 
 
Slack Bundles and Firm Performance 
Although firms with parallel resource abundance (Figure 1: quadrant I) have all the resources 
necessary to discover and exploit new opportunities, resources do not discover and exploit 
opportunities by themselves (Sirmon et al., 2011). Rather, entrepreneurs should utilize these 
resources to perceive and act upon new opportunities (Penrose, 1959). Resource constraints 
theorists posit that there are important costs associated with large resource endowments, such as 
core rigidities and reduced experimentation, which impair an entrepreneur‘s ability to perceive 
and act upon opportunities (Mosakowski, 2002).  
When firms have abundant slack resources and do not experience constraints, 
entrepreneurs are likely to feel comfortable with the status quo and are less likely to take strategic 
actions (e.g., Mosakowski, 2002). Debruyne et al. (2010), for instance, show that abundant 
resources lead people to believe that they are able to react effectively to competitive attacks but at 
the same time make them less motivated to take actions to counter such attacks. Entrepreneurs in 
firms with parallel resource abundance are also more likely to hold the attitude that their firms are 
doing well relative to entrepreneurs in firms that are experiencing constraints (Danneels, 2008). 
This attitude leads to more complacent, inward-looking and risk-averse behavior in the firms with 
parallel resource abundance (Stevenson and Gumpert, 1985), which hampers strategic change and 
firm performance (Kraatz and Zajac, 2001).  
 Moreover, people have a natural tendency to engage in exploitation at the expense of 
exploration (Levinthal and March, 1993). Firms characterized by parallel resource abundance are 
expected to focus their attention more on exploiting and leveraging their existing resource 
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bundles to generate profits (Agarwal and Audretsch, 2001; Kraatz and Zajac, 2001). Bhide 
(1992), for instance, argues that entrepreneurial start-ups that acquire significant amounts of 
external resources are confronted with a serious challenge because external stakeholders often 
push firms to exploit their existing strategies—for which they raised those resources—but this 
―can hinder entrepreneurs from following the try-it, fix-it approach required in the uncertain 
environments in which start-ups flourish‖ (p. 112). More generally, firms with parallel resource 
abundance are more likely to focus on ―static efficiency‖ by applying and improving their current 
resource bundles at the expense of their ―dynamic efficiency‖ from pursuing new strategic 
options, which is required in high-velocity environments to maintain performance advantages 
(Ghemawat and Costa, 1993; Kraatz and Zajac, 2001). Firms that experience resource constraints 
(Figure 1: quadrants II, III and IV), however, are forced to seek alternative ways to create profits 
and, as a result, will engage more often in exploration to pursue new and more radical business 
opportunities (Mosakowski, 2002). 
The resource constraints literature further posits that firms with fewer resources rather 
than more are likely to leverage their existing resources more efficiently (Baker and Nelson, 
2005). Hamel and Prahalad (1993) provide a range of resource leveraging examples, such as Dell 
Computer, which in its early years ―could never have matched Compaq‘s dealer network or 
IBM‘s direct sales force, so the company chose to sell its computers by mail‖ (p. 83). Starr and 
MacMillan (1990) further show how resource-constrained entrepreneurs rely on resource 
cooptation strategies (such as obtaining access to resources that are underutilized by others 
through borrowing, begging or scavenging) that can greatly benefit firm performance. Finally, the 
mechanism of ―bounded creativity‖ argues that the human mind is more productive when some 
restrictions apply (i.e., when entrepreneurs experience resource constraints), which results in 
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identifying not only more but also more creative and diverse opportunities (Goldenberg et al., 
2001).  
In sum, the resource constraints literature suggests that resource abundance is not 
necessarily beneficial (Garud and Karnoe, 2003; Mosakowski, 2002) and that, especially in an 
entrepreneurial setting, firms may benefit from experiencing resource constraints (Baker and 
Nelson, 2005). This benefit occurs for both firms experiencing parallel constraints (Figure 1: 
quadrant IV) and those experiencing selective constraints (Figure 1: quadrants II and III). Baker 
and Nelson (2005), for example, provide detailed case study evidence showing how 
entrepreneurs have an impressive ability to create something from nothing in one specific domain 
or even in multiple domains, thereby pursuing new opportunities despite their inability (or 
refusal) to attract the multiplicity of resources that other firms consider to be essential. Thus, 
 
Hypothesis 1: Firm performance will be higher when firms experience resource 
constraints (i.e., quadrants II, III and IV) relative to parallel resource abundance (i.e., 
quadrant I). 
 
Not all bundles with resource constraints are the same, however, and we argue that 
distinct bundles with resource constraints have their own performance effects. Specifically, in 
contrast to firms that experience selective resource constraints (Figure 1: quadrants II and III), 
firms that experience parallel constraints (Figure 1: quadrant IV) may be more challenged and in 
danger of finding themselves in a resource constraints trap. There are limits with regard to how 
far resources can be stretched, and multiple constraints may become insurmountable (Hoegl et 
al., 2008). Moreover, entrepreneurs may become so focused on finding ways to make do with 
their limited resources that they lack time to focus on other critical tasks, such as managing their 
firms and identifying new opportunities (Patzelt and Shepherd, 2009). Therefore, combining 
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constraints in one resource with slack in another resource, rather than experiencing constraints in 
multiple resources, is expected to lead to higher performance because selective constraints allow 
entrepreneurs to avoid the resource constraints trap. 
Moreover, we expect that firms that combine slack in financial resources with constraints 
in human resources (Figure 1: quadrant II) will outperform firms that combine HR slack with 
constraints in financial resources (Figure 1: quadrant III). Absorbed HR slack is ―sticky‖ and 
difficult to relocate in the short term, which limits firms‘ strategic flexibility (Mishina et al., 
2004; Voss et al., 2008). Specifically, existing human resources―and their related specialized 
skills―will fit with the existing strategies being pursued (Mishina et al., 2004). When the 
competitive environment changes and new skills and strategies are required, existing human 
resources may become obsolete and even ill-suited to address these changes in the environment. 
For example, one of the significant challenges for firms that are attempting to make the transition 
into the Internet of Things (IoT) business is that current employees, irrespective of their 
functional backgrounds, lack the skills and capabilities that meet the needs of IoT business 
models (Fitts, 2014). The existing buffer of human resources may then push firms towards 
exploiting existing resource bundles and strategies at the expense of exploration and reacting to 
changes in the environment (Voss et al., 2008). Such behavior is especially problematic in high-
velocity environments in which strategic change is important for maintaining alignment with a 
changing environment, which can pose a significant threat to firms‘ continued performance 
(Kraatz and Zajac, 2001).  
The combination of slack in financial resources with constraints in human resources 
(Figure 1: quadrant II) is expected to provide the best of two worlds. Specifically, the buffers of 
easily redeployable financial resources increase firms‘ ability to react quickly to changes in the 
environment (George, 2005; Voss et al., 2008). At the same time, constraints in human resources 
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keep entrepreneurs vigilant and reduce the overoptimistic and complacent behavior found in 
resource-rich firms (Stevenson and Gumpert, 1985).
1
 
In sum, we expect that constraints in certain resources will need to be compensated by 
abundance in others. As such, firms that are characterized by selective constraints will perform 
better relative to those that are characterized by parallel resource constraints. However, not all 
selective resource constraints are the same. Firm performance is expected to be higher when 
firms combine slack in unabsorbed financial resources with constraints in absorbed and ―sticky‖ 
human resources. Thus, 
 
Hypothesis 2: Firm performance will be higher when firms experience selective resource 
constraints in human resources (i.e., quadrant II) relative to selective resource constraints 
in financial resources (i.e., quadrant III) and parallel resource constraints (i.e., quadrant 
IV). 
 
Slack Bundles and Firm Performance: New Firms versus Later-Stage Firms  
Bundles of slack resources are unlikely to operate independently of a firm‘s stage of 
development. New firms and later-stage firms have different resource needs and resource 
management challenges (Sirmon et al., 2011). Paralleling prior research (McDougall and Oviatt, 
1996; Zahra, 1996; Zahra et al., 2002), we define firms as new when they are eight years old or 
less and as later-stage when they are more than eight years old. The general premise of the 
resource constraints literature holds for both new and later-stage firms: firms characterized by 
resource constraints (Figure 1: quadrants II, III and IV) will exhibit higher performance relative 
to firms characterized by parallel resource abundance (Figure 1: quadrant I)―in part because of 
the less efficient use of resources in the latter group of firms. However, the resource constraints 
literature also suggests that certain types of constraints may not be viable as firms age.  
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Specifically, as firms become older, the resource constraints literature posits that it is 
difficult to keep operating under parallel resource constraints (Figure 1: quadrant IV). Some firms 
clearly have an impressive ability to perform well without possessing the diverse set of resources 
that other firms consider to be essential (Starr and MacMillan, 1990). As firms continue to be 
confronted by multiple constraints, however, the lack of focus and routines in these firms 
combined with the continued pursuit of new opportunities without consideration of the firms‘ 
historical competencies and commitments (Baker and Nelson, 2005) is expected to result in ―an 
unordered and disharmonious mixture of capabilities‖ (Selznick, 1957, p. 144), which will 
eventually hamper firm performance (Kraatz and Zajac, 2001). When firms are unable to shift 
from experiencing constraints in multiple domains to selective constraints, they often become so 
enmeshed in the communities they created that they are both unable to realize profits within them 
and unable to exploit opportunities from outside of them (Baker and Nelson, 2005; Porac et al., 
1989).  
In sum, although having low levels of financial and HR slack (i.e., parallel resource 
constraints) is beneficial for new firms‘ performance, this bundle is expected to be less valuable 
for firms in later stages of development. As firms develop, Baker and Nelson (2005) argue that 
they must develop towards selective constraints in inputs, which allows them to generate more 
efficient business routines, permitting them to realize more profits. Thus, 
 
Hypothesis 3: Firm performance will benefit more from parallel resource constraints (i.e., 
quadrant IV) in new firms relative to firms in later stages of development.  
 
Slack Bundles and Firm Survival 
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So far, our theorizing has focused on how bundles of slack resources affect firm performance. 
However, firm performance and survival represent two conceptually distinct outcomes, and their 
relationship is complex (Gimeno et al., 1997): performance does not guarantee survival, and 
survival does not guarantee performance. As such, it is possible that those bundles that are 
associated with higher performance are also the riskiest for firm survival. Scholars disagree on 
the relationship between resources and survival, however. A number of scholars argue that firms 
with fewer resources are more likely to fail relative to firms with more resources (Brüderl and 
Schüssler, 1990; Cooper et al., 1994). Others indicate that firms are able to survive and function 
with a bare minimum of resources (Baker and Nelson, 2005) and that the survival advantages 
bestowed by more resources are less relevant, particularly for firms in technology-based 
industries (Agarwal and Audretsch, 2001). 
 Consistent with the resource constraints literature, we argue that firms with resource 
constraints are not necessarily at a disadvantage relative to firms with parallel resource 
abundance (Baker and Nelson, 2005). Firms that combine slack in one type of resource with 
constraints in another type of resource (i.e., firms with selective resource constraints) may be 
sufficiently buffered against external shocks and internal disruptions (Thompson, 1967). For 
instance, firms with slack in financial resources but constraints in human resources (Figure 1: 
quadrant II) are unlikely to experience liquidity problems—one of the main factors that drive 
entrepreneurial firms into bankruptcy (e.g., Laitinen, 1992). Additionally, firms with HR slack 
but constraints in financial resources (Figure 1: quadrant III) can resort to a variety of 
bootstrapping techniques—techniques that allow entrepreneurs to access resources at minimal (or 
no) cost or allow entrepreneurs to access resources without the need the raise new cash from 
traditional outside financiers, such as banks (Winborg and Landström, 2001). Harrison et al. 
(2004) show that bootstrapping techniques—such as using special deals for access to hardware, 
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customer-funded R&D, working from home and prepaid licenses, royalties, advances from 
customers—are heavily used in the software industry. Moreover, a significant buffer of human 
resources makes it socially less acceptable for firms to go out of business, which is expected to 
increase the support of a firm‘s community. Wren and Storey (2002), for instance, show that a 
firm‘s probability of receiving publicly subsidized ―soft‖ business support increases (at a 
decreasing rate) as its HR base increases, which benefits a firm‘s survival probability. 
 Resource constraints theorists further suggest that firms can address multiple constraints 
in multiple domains (Figure 1: quadrant IV), for instance, through strategies such as begging, 
borrowing and scavenging to obtain access to underutilized resources from their social 
relationships (Starr and MacMillan, 1990). However, these same scholars also indicate that 
although entrepreneurs may use their social contacts to access resources without owning the 
resources, the opportunity costs and risks of such strategies may be high given the lack of formal 
commitments, uncertainty, and possibilities of opportunistic behavior (Starr and MacMillan, 
1990). For instance, resource providers with whom firms have no formal contracts may decide 
from one day to another that they are no longer willing to provide resources under the same 
conditions or may refrain from providing resources altogether. Overall, this possibility suggests 
that firms with parallel resource constraints might be able to address the constraints but that the 
strategies used do not necessarily reduce (and indeed may even increase) their vulnerability to 
internal disruptions and external shocks. Thus, 
 
Hypothesis 4: Firm survival will be lower when firms experience parallel resource 
constraints (i.e., quadrant IV) relative to selective resource constraints (i.e., quadrants II 
and III) and parallel resource abundance (i.e., quadrant I). 
 
METHODS 
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Sample and Data Sources  
The data for this paper come from the VICO consortium―a group of nine European research 
teams. This consortium constructed a large longitudinal data set to provide a detailed picture of 
the financing and development of technology-based entrepreneurial firms in seven European 
countries: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. Technology-based 
entrepreneurial firms were identified as firms that (a) were less than 10 years old in 1994 or 
founded afterwards; (b) operate in high-tech sectors, including aerospace, biotech, energy, ICT 
manufacturing, Internet, nanotech, pharmaceutical, robotics, software, telecom, web publishing 
and other R&D; and (c) were independent at startup. The VICO data set comprises 8,370 
technology-based entrepreneurial firms and covers data from 1994 until 2009. The data set also 
includes firms that left the sample due to bankruptcy, acquisitions or buy-outs between 1994 and 
2009 (see Bertoni and Martí (2011) for more details on the VICO data set). 
Research teams in each country collected data from multiple sources. Financial and 
employment data come from Amadeus, a database that includes high-quality comparable 
information for public and private firms across Europe (Faccio et al., 2011). These data were 
validated and updated with data from country-specific databases, such as Bel-first for Belgium 
(Vanacker et al., 2013) and Fame for the UK (Brav, 2009), which often comprise more detailed 
data. Ownership data, including venture capital (VC) backing, were obtained from the Thomson 
ONE (former VentureXpert) and Zephyr databases, which are extensively used in VC research 
(De Clercq and Dimov, 2008). Patent data come from PATSTAT, a database that provides a 
snapshot of the EPO master documentation database with worldwide coverage on patents, 
including bibliographic data, citations and family links (Devigne et al., 2013). Each local team 
initially checked the data for reliability and internal consistency. Next, the data were regularly 
17 
 
sent to a central data collection unit, which ensured that information across countries was 
consistent and comparable.  
 From the VICO data set, we first select firms that operate in the ICT industry (6,625 firms 
remain). Focusing on firms that operate in one industry limits the unobserved heterogeneity 
among firms that results from variance in industry conditions. By focusing in this way, we also 
address a call by George (2005) for studies that examine multiple forms of slack in a single 
industry. Second, we exclude firms from Germany because we lack basic financial data for 
German firms (5,550 firms remain). In Germany, failure to disclose financial accounts is not a 
punishable offence for small- and medium-sized firms, which explains our lack of basic data. 
Finally, our regression approach requires firms to have complete data for at least two years. 
These selection filters result in a final sample of 4,715 European firms (from Belgium, Finland, 
France, Italy, Spain and the UK) that were active in the ICT industry between 1994 and 2009, 
covering 30,669 firm-year observations. Appendix A provides an overview of the sample by 
founding period, year, country and ICT sub-industries. 
 
Dependent Variables 
Our theory posits that different bundles of slack resources will differently influence firm 
performance and survival. Firm performance is operationalized as Earnings Before Interest, 
Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA) scaled by total assets. We use EBITDA instead 
of net income to minimize the effect of accounting (e.g., depreciations) and tax treatments on our 
results. EBITDA is scaled by total assets to make it comparable for firms of different sizes and to 
reduce heteroskedasticity concerns (Brav, 2009).
2
 To study firm survival, we examine the 
probability that a firm will exit over the next year, conditional on it having survived up to the 
current year. Firms may exit the sample if they shut down, stop operating as separate entities 
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because of merger or acquisitions, or are stripped of workers and assets and essentially become 
―empty shells‖. As described in Appendix B, our results remain virtually identical when we use 
alternative measures of firm performance and survival.
 
 
Independent Variables 
To calculate slack, we use financial ratios, as has been done in prior work (e.g., Bradley et al., 
2011a,b; George, 2005; Mishina et al., 2004; Mousa and Reed, 2013). Motivated by our theory 
development, we focus on bundles of financial (available) slack and HR slack.
3 
Because cash resources represent the most easily redeployable resources and provide 
managers with the greatest discretion in allocation to alternative uses (George, 2005), we measure 
financial slack as the amount of cash available within a firm scaled by total assets (Kim and 
Bettis, 2014; Vanacker et al., 2013). From this ratio, we subtract the median ratio of cash to total 
assets for all firms operating in the same ICT sub-industry (i.e., ICT manufacturing, telecom, web 
publishing, Internet and software) and country. Our approach is consistent with prior (single 
country) research that has defined slack as excess resources held by firms relative to industry 
norms (Bromiley, 1991; George, 2005).  
HR slack is measured as employment cost relative to sales (Bradley et al., 2011b), from 
which we subtract the median ratio of employment cost to sales for all firms in the same sub-
industry and country in which the focal firm operates. Prior work has used similar definitions of 
HR slack, such as the number of employees to sales adjusted for industry norms (e.g., Mellahi 
and Wilkinson 2010; Mishina et al., 2004). We use employment cost rather than the number of 
employees as the basis for our calculation of HR slack. Empirically, employment cost is better 
completed for the private firms in our sample and is highly correlated with the number of 
employees (at 0.97; p < 0.01). Employment cost is hence a good proxy for the number of 
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employees in a firm. Theoretically, employment cost captures both the quantity and the quality of 
human resources (Vanacker et al., 2013). 
 We test for the hypothesized effects of different bundles of financial and HR slack on firm 
outcomes by using two distinct approaches (e.g., Sirmon et al., 2010). First, we utilize dummy 
variables to identify the firms represented by the four quadrants presented in Figure 1. For this 
purpose, we identify firms as having financial (HR) slack when their cash-to-total asset ratio 
(employment-cost-to-sales ratio) is above the sub-industry and country median values. Firms are 
identified as experiencing constraints in financial (human) resources when these ratios are below 
the sub-industry and country median values. Second, we estimate models with financial slack and 
its squared term, HR slack and its squared term and the interaction between financial and HR 
slack.
4, 5 
 
Control Variables 
We control for a variety of variables that are standard controls in studies on the performance 
effects of slack resources and variables that are specific to our context.  
We include a number of firm-level controls. Firm size is expected to influence both the 
performance potential of firms and their ability to accumulate slack (George, 2005). We control 
for firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of sales plus one. Because slack is time-
dependent in its accumulation, we control for firm age (Sharfman et al., 1988). Firm age is 
measured as the years since incorporation. Firms with growth ambitions require more (different) 
resources (Sapienza et al., 2003). The intangible assets ratio, defined as the ratio of intangible 
assets (including R&D expenses and the value of patents, trademarks and brands) to total assets, 
is used as a measure for firms‘ growth potential (Villalonga, 2004). We also control for firms‘ 
knowledge intensity (Vanacker et al., 2013) by including the natural logarithm of the cumulative 
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number of patents applied for (plus one). The number of patents applied for is discounted using a 
0.15 discount factor, as is common in the literature on innovation economics (Griliches, 1992). 
The mere presence of a VC investor allows portfolio firms to realize more with a given set of 
slack resources relative to firms without VC backing (Vanacker et al., 2013). We therefore 
include a VC dummy that is equal to 1 if a firm is backed by at least one VC investor and zero 
otherwise. Further, we control for other types of slack. Potential slack is measured as the debt-to-
total-assets ratio (Kim and Bettis, 2014), adjusted for sub-industry and country norms. We 
multiply this measure by -1 so that higher values indicate more potential slack. We also include 
the squared term to capture any curvilinear effect. Recoverable slack is defined as inventories to 
sales, adjusted for sub-industry and country norms (Bourgeois and Singh, 1983; Steensma and 
Corley, 2001).
6
 We also include the squared term to capture any curvilinear effect. Finally, to 
account for possible persistence in firm performance, we included lagged performance. Adding 
the lagged dependent variable has also been recommended as a means to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity (Heckman and Borjas, 1980).  
In all models, we further control for industry, country and year effects. Specifically, 
industry fixed effects control for subtle differences within the ICT industry. The country fixed 
effects control for potential country effects, including unmeasured cultural differences and 
differences in accounting requirements. The year fixed effects control for the effects of any 
general economic trend.  
To minimize concerns of reverse causality, all independent and control variables are 
lagged by one period.  
 
Method of Analysis 
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When using longitudinal data, scholars need to account for correlations between observations 
from the same firm when estimating regression parameters; otherwise, they can make incorrect 
inferences. We use the generalized estimating equation (GEE) approach to estimate efficient and 
unbiased regression parameters for longitudinal data (see Ballinger, 2004, for a detailed 
discussion). Relative to fixed- and random-effects models, the GEE model provides more 
consistent and robust regression parameters when autocorrelation because of non-independence is 
present (Ndofor et al., 2011). In addition, GEE models can be used for a range of dependent 
variables, including those that are normally distributed (i.e., firm performance) and binary 
dependent variables (i.e., firm survival).
7
 Applications of the GEE technique are widely available 
in the literature (e.g., Ballinger, 2004; Haveman and Nonnemaker, 2000). 
 
RESULTS 
Table I provides an overview of the means, standard deviations, minima, maxima and 
correlations between the variables used in the empirical models. Table II provides additional 
descriptive statistics on the average levels of slack, performance and exit rates for each of the 
four bundles of slack depicted in Figure 1.  
INSERT TABLE I AND TABLE II ABOUT HERE 
Table III reports the results from the GEE regression models that examine the relationship 
between distinct slack bundles and firm performance. In Model 1, we use dummies that represent 
the different resource bundles (parallel resource abundance is the reference category). In Model 
2, we take a different approach by including the linear and quadratic effects of financial and HR 
slack and the interaction between both. Models 3 and 4 are equivalent to Models 1 and 2 but 
focus on the subsample of new firms, whereas Models 5 and 6 focus on the subsample of later-
stage firms.  
22 
 
INSERT TABLE III ABOUT HERE 
 The control variables show that larger firms have lower performance ratios, and older 
firms exhibit higher performance. Firms with more potential slack exhibit lower performance. 
Firms with more recoverable slack also exhibit lower performance, especially at high levels of 
recoverable slack. Moreover, firms that were more profitable in the past are likely to be more 
profitable in the future; hence, performance is persistent. 
 Our results support Hypothesis 1: firms with resource constraints in one or multiple 
domains perform better than firms with parallel resource abundance. As shown in Model 1, firms 
with selective constraints in human resources but with slack in financial resources (Figure 1: 
quadrant II) exhibit higher performance (β = 0.025; p < 0.01) relative to firms with parallel 
resource abundance. Firms with selective constraints in financial resources but with HR slack 
(Figure 1: quadrant III) exhibit higher performance (β = 0.012; p < 0.01) relative to firms with 
parallel resource abundance. Finally, firms with parallel resource constraints (Figure 1: quadrant 
IV) exhibit higher performance (β = 0.011; p < 0.01) relative to firms with parallel resource 
abundance. Our results further support Hypothesis 2: firms that combine resource constraints in 
human resources with slack in financial resources (Figure 1: quadrant II) exhibit the highest 
performance. Indeed, whereas both firms with selective constraints in financial resources and 
firms with parallel resource constraints have an EBITDA-to-total assets ratio that is 
approximately 1.1–1.2 percentage points higher than firms with parallel resource abundance, 
firms with selective constraints in human resources have a 2.5-percentage-point higher ratio. The 
differences between firms with selective constraints in human resources and those with 
constraints in financial resources or parallel resource constraints are significant (all at p < 0.01). 
  Model 2 confirms the existence of quadratic relationships between financial (HR) slack 
and firm performance, which is consistent with prior research. Model 2 also shows a negative and 
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significant interaction effect between financial and HR slack (β = -15.991; p < 0.01). Figure 2 
provides a rich visualization of the combined effects of financial slack and HR slack. Firm 
performance is plotted according to distinct combinations of financial (x-axis) and HR (y-axis) 
slack. The figure shows that increasing levels of financial slack have a largely positive effect on 
firm performance when HR slack is low but that increasing levels of financial slack have a 
largely negative effect on firm performance when HR slack is high. Figure 2 also shows that 
firms that combine high levels of financial slack with low levels of HR slack exhibit the highest 
performance. These findings provide additional supporting evidence for Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 Our results support Hypothesis 3: parallel resource constraints only provide a 
performance advantage for new firms but not for later-stage firms. The coefficient of parallel 
resource constraints in Model 3 (β = 0.014; p < 0.01) is positive and significant for new firms, but 
in Model 5, the coefficient is no longer significantly different from zero for later-stage firms. 
Interestingly, firms with selective constraints in human resources but slack in financial resources 
outperform the other bundles in both the subsample of new firms (β = 0.032; p < 0.01) and that of 
firms at later stages of development (β = 0.016; p < 0.01). It is also important to note in Model 5 
that for firms in later stages of development with selective constraints in financial resources and 
slack in human resources (β = 0.007; p = 0.111), the performance advantage is no longer 
statistically significant at traditional levels, although it is close to being marginally significant. A 
comparison of the interaction between financial and HR slack in Models 4 and 6 shows that this 
interaction is more negative for new firms relative to later-stage firms (p < 0.01). A graphical 
visualization (unreported owing to space considerations) of Models 4 and 6 confirms that firms 
with selective constraints in human resources but slack in financial resources outperform the 
other bundles for both new and later-stage firms. 
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Table IV reports the GEE discrete-time survival regressions that examined the 
relationships between distinct slack bundles and firm exit, where negative and significant 
coefficients imply that firm exit rates are lower (survival rates are higher) for larger values of the 
independent variables and controls. In Model 1, we use dummies that represent the different 
resource bundles (parallel resource abundance is the reference category). In Model 2, we take a 
different approach by including the linear and quadratic effects of financial and HR slack and the 
interaction between both. Models 3 and 4 are equivalent to Models 1 and 2 but focus on the 
subsample of new firms, and Models 5 and 6 focus on the later-stage firms.  
INSERT TABLE IV ABOUT HERE 
 The control variables indicate that larger, older firms and more profitable firms have 
lower exit rates. Interestingly, although potential and recoverable slack hamper financial 
performance, they foster firm survival. 
Our results support Hypothesis 4: firms with parallel resource constraints have higher exit 
rates (lower survival rates) relative to firms with parallel resource abundance and selective 
resource constraints. Model 1 shows that firms with parallel resource constraints have higher exit 
rates (at p < 0.01) relative to firms with parallel resource abundance. Interestingly, there are no 
significant differences in the exit rates of firms with selective resource constraints relative to 
firms with parallel resource abundance. Our findings hold in the subsamples of both new (Model 
3) and later-stage (Model 5) firms, where firms with parallel resource constraints have 
significantly higher exit rates (all at p < 0.05). Model 2 shows that financial slack has a negative 
(but decreasing) effect on firm exit. HR slack also has a negative (but decreasing) effect on firm 
exit. Interestingly, although HR slack increases firm survival rates, it decreases firm financial 
performance. The interaction effect between financial and HR slack on firm exit rates is positive 
and statistically significant (for the full sample at p < 0.10 and later-stage firms at p < 0.05 but 
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not at traditional levels for new firms). A graphical visualization of Model 2 in Figure 3 shows 
that firms with parallel resource constraints are indeed confronted with the highest exit rates 
(lowest survival rates). These findings emerge from the subsamples of new firms (Model 4) and 
later-stage firms (Model 6) as well. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 We performed a number of tests that demonstrate the robustness of our results. These 
robustness tests are described in Appendix B.  
 
DISCUSSION 
The results of this study enrich an ongoing debate on the importance of slack resources and 
provide a more complex picture of the effects of slack resources on firm outcomes. Our 
theoretical and empirical focus on the effects of distinct bundles of slack resources on firm 
performance and survival, and their temporal dynamics, yields important new insights. We 
explore these new insights and their implications for the slack literature and resource-based 
literature in more detail below. 
 
Implications for Slack Literature 
Prior research has argued that the relationship between an isolated type of slack and firm 
performance is inverted U-shaped because too little of this slack type causes constrained decision 
making and too much facilitates inefficient behavior (Tan and Peng, 2003). Because these studies 
focus on an isolated slack resource, the view of classic resource-based theorists (i.e., ―more is 
better‖) is incompatible with the view of resource constraints theorists (i.e., ―less is more‖). The 
solution provided by extant research is that ―an intermediated level of slack is optimal‖ (Nohria 
and Gulati, 1997, p. 603). However, studies still provide ambiguous results, for example, 
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showing positive (George, 2005), curvilinear (Bradley et al., 2011a) and negative (Natividad, 
2013) relationships between financial slack and firm performance. 
Our study provides a novel perspective that reframes the ongoing debate on the 
performance effect of slack. Although the mechanisms we propose are similar to those of prior 
research, we argue that these mechanisms operate at the higher level of a firm‘s bundle of slack 
resources rather than at the level of an isolated slack resource. Specifically, inefficient behavior 
(constrained decision making) is more likely to arise when firms combine resource slack 
(resource constraints) in too many domains. In our perspective, classic resource-based and 
resource constraints viewpoints are not incongruent and firms should not necessarily combine 
intermediate levels of all types of resources. On the contrary, firms can combine ―more‖ of a 
specific resource with ―less‖ of another resource, and our empirical evidence shows that it is 
exactly this combination that leads to superior performance. Our findings are consistent with 
creativity research (e.g., Moreau and Dahl, 2005), which argues that individuals are more creative 
when they are confronted with some input constraints, making them more effective at meeting 
specific goals.  
Our perspective further provides an explanation for the mixed findings on the 
performance effects of slack at the level of an individual type of slack. In our perspective, even in 
a homogenous set of firms (for example, a sample of new ICT firms), very different types of 
relationships (i.e., positive, curvilinear or negative) can emerge between a specific type of 
resource slack and firm performance. When firms are conceived as bundles of resources, 
resources may interact with one another and enhance or suppress each other‘s effects on 
performance (Black and Boal, 1994). Although this has been underappreciated in prior research, 
our empirical evidence indeed shows that fundamentally different relationships emerge between 
specific types of resource slack and firm performance, depending on the level of other types of 
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slack (see Figure 2 for a graphical visualization). Overall, our study highlights the importance of 
investigating the performance implications of slack at the level of a firm‘s bundle of slack 
resources rather than studying the effects of isolated slack resources, thereby emphasizing 
important interdependencies between these resources. 
 
Implications for Resource-Based Literature 
Extant resource-based work has largely focused on isolated resources, including human 
resources, social capital and technological resources, because these resources are valuable, rare, 
inimitable, and nonsubstitutable (Barney, 1991); hence, they can lead to a sustainable competitive 
advantage. At the same time, limited attention has been paid in RBV to more generic resources, 
such as financial capital, because generic resources are unlikely to provide firms with a 
sustainable competitive advantage (Ireland et al., 2003). Building on this research, one could 
argue that managers should simply build resource bundles that comprise abundant valuable, rare, 
and inimitable resources that cannot be substituted, such as human resources. They should pay 
less attention to accumulating more generic resources, such as financial resources; although firms 
may have these, they are unlikely to provide a sustainable competitive advantage. Our results 
differ from such RBV propositions. Specifically, we find that firms that combine abundant 
generic financial resources with constraints in human resources exhibit superior performance. 
Our results have at least two important implications for resource-based theory.  
First, current resource-based work, because of its common focus on isolated resources, 
ignores the possibility that more generic resources may allow firms to acquire other more 
strategic resources when needed (Lee et al., 2001). Sustainable competitive advantages may then 
result not only from possessing resources with particular characteristics (Barney, 1991) but also 
from managers‘ ability to quickly pursue new opportunities and buy in to the most suitable 
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strategic resources when they are needed. As Penrose (1959) suggested, resources by themselves 
may not be sufficient to generate sustainable competitive advantages; how managers use their 
resources may be equally important. Overall, although simply possessing generic resources 
cannot drive a sustainable competitive advantage either, these resources may allow managers to 
pursue unique strategies that provide their firms with sustainable competitive advantages. 
Second, our study does not suggest that managers should avoid attracting less generic 
resources (for example, better-educated and better-trained human resources) to fulfill normal 
resource needs. However, our study does suggest that managers should be careful when 
integrating buffers of less generic, absorbed resources in their resource bundles because such 
resource bundles may constrain their firms‘ strategic flexibility (Mishina et al., 2004). These 
findings suggest that there may be an important distinction between the characteristics of the 
resources firms should attract to fulfill their ―normal‖ resource needs and the characteristics of 
the resources firms may want to keep in ―excess‖ for when unexpected opportunities or 
environmental shifts occur. 
Finally, by demonstrating the advantages and disadvantages related to particular resource 
bundles at different stages in the firm life cycle, we provide crucial extensions that cross-validate 
the theoretical value of resource-based theories (e.g., Armstrong and Shimizu, 2007; Priem and 
Butler, 2001). We show that there are few resource bundles that provide performance benefits at 
different stages in the firm life cycle without hampering firm survival. However, there are many 
resource bundles that provide no specific performance benefits, only provide performance 
benefits at a particular stage in the life cycle and even reduce firm survival prospects. In addition, 
managers are confronted with important resource management challenges. Even when firms hold 
an ―optimal‖ resource bundle, natural pressures—such as the age-dependent nature of slack 
accumulation (Sharfman et al., 1988) or environmental shocks that make previously accumulated 
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strategic resources obsolete (Leonard‐Barton, 1992)—may drive them towards suboptimal 
bundles. These findings provide an explanation for why sustainable competitive advantages are 
often short-lived (Wiggins and Ruefli, 2005).  
 
Limitations and Avenues for Further Research 
This study is not without limitations, some of which suggest avenues for future research. First, 
theoretical tractability pushed us to focus on bundles of slack resources for two types of resources 
(financial and human). Although all firms require some of both, they do not represent the 
complete set of resources that firms require to start up and grow. Other types of slack resources 
include operational, customer-related and innovational slack (Mousa and Reed, 2013; Voss et al., 
2008). Of particular interest for future research is the question of how far resource constraints in 
multiple domains can stretch and whether the ―optimal‖ combination of resource abundance and 
scarcity is contingent upon firm and environmental characteristics. 
Second, our measure of HR slack, or excess numbers of employees on the payroll, is 
rather crude. Specifically, we define HR slack as employment cost on sales adjusted for industry 
and country norms—a measure that is virtually identical to (and hence highly correlated with) 
measures used by other scholars, such as number of employees on sales adjusted for industry 
norms (e.g., Mishina et al., 2004). However, exploring the role of HR slack more fully, for 
instance, by using more fine-grained measures of HR slack that indicate if employees within the 
firm possess the necessary critical human capital resources would be an enriching avenue for 
further inquiry. 
Third, our study focuses on the direct link between slack resources and firm performance 
but does not provide direct evidence for the mechanisms through which different bundles of slack 
resources influence performance and survival. In our theorizing, largely drawing on resource 
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constraints theories, we suggested a number of mechanisms through which different bundles of 
slack resources are expected to influence performance. These mechanisms include differences in 
the willingness and ability of firms with different slack bundles to act upon new opportunities 
(and related changes in the external environment) and differences in entrepreneurial creativity to 
make do with the limited resources at hand. Many of these mechanisms are difficult to measure 
and would require us to supplement our database with survey evidence (e.g., Bradley et al., 
2011b). Future research might collect finer-grained data and study the factors that mediate the 
relationship between bundles of slack resources and firm outcomes.  
 Finally, although our robustness checks demonstrate that our findings hold in an 
independent sample of other technology-based firms and in subsamples that comprise different 
institutional contexts, future research might establish whether our results generalize to a more 
diverse set of industries (such as, for instance, low-tech industries) and more diverse institutional 
contexts (such as, for instance, developing economies). Replicating this study in other industries 
and institutional contexts would be of interest to further establish the generalizability of our 
results. Moreover, scholars may study the impact of distinct bundles of slack resources on firm 
innovation. Emerging areas in innovation research, such as jugaad innovation (George et al., 
2012; Radjou et al., 2012), suggest that entrepreneurs can also be innovative under conditions of 
poverty.  
 
Policy and Managerial Implications 
Our distinction between the resource bundles and conditions that lead to performance advantages 
and those that do not carries important policy and managerial implications. Technology-based 
entrepreneurial firms are widely regarded as important contributors to innovation, employment 
creation and economic growth in our modern knowledge-based economies. EU policy-makers, 
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however, often talk of a ―European paradox‖: although the scientific performance of European 
technology-based firms is excellent, their commercial performance has deteriorated (European 
Commission, 1995). Our findings suggest that parallel constraints in financial and human 
resources negatively affect the viability of technology-based firms. Governments play a key task 
in stimulating the availability of financial resources. Governments can also address the ―sticky‖ 
nature of HR slack, which often damages firm performance, by optimizing labor laws and 
stimulating employee education and training for technology-based firms. 
However, our study also shows that it is important for early-stage entrepreneurs to 
recognize that the solution for confronting many of the challenges facing them is not necessarily 
―having more resources‖. In a similar vein, managers in later-stage firms that face continuous 
pressures to remove all ―inefficiencies‖ and build lean firms should be careful in significantly 
reducing all buffers. Combining financial resource abundance with resource constraints in 
―sticky‖ human resources is often optimal for firm performance and does not weaken the survival 
prospects of technology-based firms. It also suggests that entrepreneurs and managers should 
carefully craft their HR strategies, with particular attention to the questions when to attract human 
resources and how to prevent current human resources from becoming excessively sticky, thereby 
reducing firms‘ adaptability to opportunities and threats in their environments. 
 
Conclusion 
Taken together, this study provides new insights into the complex relationships between bundles 
of slack resources, firm performance and firm survival and the temporal nature of these 
relationships. The results suggest that firms that combine slack in unabsorbed financial resources 
with constraints in absorbed human resources exhibit superior firm performance without 
hampering their survival prospects.  
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NOTES 
1 
It is not because firms with slack in financial resources and constraints in human resources (Figure 1: quadrant II) 
pursue new opportunities that they automatically evolve towards a different resource bundle (such as quadrants I, III 
or IV). As firms consume part of their financial slack to pursue new opportunities, they may still have financial slack 
left, or at the same time build up additional financial slack from their existing (and new) operations. As another 
example, it is not because firms use their financial slack to pursue new opportunities and hire new employees that 
they will necessarily develop HR slack. This is true because HR slack is measured relative to human resource 
demands, and as firms pursue new opportunities, their demands for human resources may also be higher, so that HR 
slack may not develop. 
2 
EBITDA scaled by total assets is highly correlated with alternative performance measures, such as gross profit 
scaled by total assets (0.879; p < 0.001) and EBIT scaled by total assets (0.960; p < 0.001).  
3 
By focusing on bundles of financial and HR slack, it may appear that we ignore some other forms of slack used in 
prior research. However, as discussed in more detail in the ‗control variables‘ section, we control for other types of 
slack, including potential (i.e., debt capacity) and recoverable (i.e., financial resources that are currently absorbed in 
inventories) slack. 
4
 We do not include nonlinear interaction effects (i.e., financial slack squared x HR slack, financial slack x HR slack 
squared and financial slack squared x HR slack squared) in our reported regression models. Empirically, these 
nonlinear interaction effects were never significant. 
5
 The approach with the dummy variables is easy to interpret. Moreover, it captures the essence of our 
configurational approach, in which we argue that bundles of slack resources are driving firm performance and 
survival rather than individual slack resources. The dummy variable approach, however, requires arbitrary cut-off 
values. Using the approach with the continuous slack variables, their squared terms and interaction terms stays closer 
to the original approach in slack research, where scholars have argued that there exists an optimal level of slack. The 
interaction effect, however, is more difficult to interpret. For instance, a negative interaction between financial slack 
and HR slack indicates that the value of financial slack is less positive for firms with higher levels of HR slack. 
However, it does not indicate whether it is optimal to combine high levels of financial slack with low levels of HR 
slack or vice versa. Moreover, interaction terms are challenging to interpret when the dependent variable is binary 
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(Hoetker, 2007), such as in models with survival as the dependent variable. These considerations explain our use of 
both approaches. 
6 
Other scholars have used selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses divided by firm sales as a measure 
of recoverable slack (Bromiley, 1991; Singh, 1986), especially in the context of public firms. Unfortunately, we do 
not have such data for the private firms we study. However, as indicated by Bradley et al. (2011a), SG&A expenses 
are actually ―lumpy‖ and less recoverable. We therefore used inventories on sales as an alternative proxy for 
recoverable slack (Bourgeois and Singh, 1983; Steensma and Corley, 2001). 
7 
In survival analysis, continuous-time methods (such as a Cox regression) are appropriate when researchers know 
the exact times at which events (exits in our case) occur (Allison, 1995). However, we rely on yearly data and know 
only the year of exit, which makes it more appropriate to use discrete-time methods (Allison, 1995). We use GEE 
discrete-time survival models with a complementary log-log-link function. For a similar approach and more detailed 
description, see Echambadi et al. (2006) and Haveman and Nonnemaker (2000). 
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Figure 1: Different Bundles of Slack Resources 
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Figure 2: Surface Plot of the Combined Effects of Financial and HR Slack on Firm Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Note. The surface plot uses three standard deviations from the means of financial slack and HR slack.  
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Figure 3: Surface Plot of the Combined Effects of Financial and HR Slack on Firm Exit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Note. The surface plot uses three standard deviations from the means of financial slack and HR slack.  
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Table I: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations  
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
a Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 Firm size 
b 6.787 1.942 0.008 15.104 1.000
2 Firm age 8.976 5.337 1.000 25.000 0.267 1.000
3 Intangible assets ratio 0.087 0.155 0.000 1.000 0.030 -0.103 1.000
4 Knowledge intensity 
b 0.067 0.314 0.000 5.420 0.137 0.003 0.039 1.000
5 VC dummy 0.073 0.261 0.000 1.000 0.073 -0.070 0.103 0.198 1.000
6 Potential slack -0.008 0.300 -0.838 0.511 0.030 0.075 -0.024 0.028 0.005 1.000
7 Recoverable slack 0.028 0.073 -0.080 0.246 0.025 0.034 0.043 0.096 0.029 -0.032 1.000
8 Lagged performance 0.105 0.272 -0.636 0.633 -0.002 0.092 -0.139 -0.158 -0.207 0.222 -0.139 1.000
9 Parallel resource abundance 
(Quadrant I)
0.239 0.426 0.000 1.000 -0.060 -0.008 -0.080 0.086 0.085 0.142 -0.057 -0.145 1.000
10 Selective resource constraints in 
human resources (Quandrant II)
0.250 0.433 0.000 1.000 -0.086 -0.016 -0.166 -0.067 -0.078 0.144 -0.114 0.253 -0.324 1.000
11 Selective resource constraints in 
financial resources (Quadrant III)
0.258 0.437 0.000 1.000 0.050 0.011 0.221 0.007 0.044 -0.163 0.079 -0.189 -0.330 -0.341 1.000
12 Parallel resource constraints 
(Quadrant IV)
0.241 0.428 0.000 1.000 0.093 0.016 0.023 -0.025 -0.055 -0.120 0.089 0.079 -0.315 -0.326 -0.332 1.000
13 Financial slack 0.057 0.202 -0.232 0.556 -0.187 -0.025 -0.238 0.019 0.013 0.302 -0.149 0.112 0.419 0.466 -0.443 -0.431 1.000
14 HR slack 0.050 0.271 -0.326 0.859 -0.124 -0.100 0.182 0.163 0.198 -0.042 0.042 -0.507 0.435 -0.425 0.399 -0.409 0.022 1.000
15 Performance 0.099 0.266 -0.636 0.633 -0.034 0.072 -0.102 -0.154 -0.189 0.058 -0.121 0.639 -0.132 0.183 -0.107 0.053 0.051 -0.385 1.000
16 Exit 0.048 0.215 0.000 1.000 -0.031 0.010 0.029 -0.002 0.019 -0.062 0.005 -0.066 -0.006 -0.024 0.016 0.015 -0.019 0.034 -0.087
a
Number of observations = 30,669. Correlations above |0.012| are significant at p < 0.05. Sub-industry dummies, country dummies and year dummies are not reported.
b
Log-transformed variable
Variables 5, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 16 are binary thus their correlations should be interpreted with care.
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Table II: Descriptive Statistics of the Different Bundles of Slack Resources 
 
 
 
Note. Although in any given year, firm exit rates are relatively low (i.e., between 5.4% and 3.9%), 34.10% of firms eventually exit the 
sample during the entire study period.   
 
  
Mean SD Mean SD
Financial slack 0.208 0.170 Financial slack -0.096 0.070
HR slack 0.261 0.262 HR slack 0.234 0.231
Performance 0.036 0.311 Performance 0.050 0.258
Exit 0.046 0.210 Exit 0.054 0.226
Mean SD Mean SD
Financial slack 0.220 0.173 Financial slack -0.098 0.070
HR slack -0.149 0.097 HR slack -0.146 0.098
Performance 0.183 0.247 Performance 0.124 0.216
Exit 0.039 0.195 Exit 0.054 0.226
a 
Number of observations = 7,315
b 
Number of observations = 7,681
c
 Number of observations = 7,904
d
 Number of observations = 7,393
FINANCIAL SLACK
High Low
H
R
 S
L
A
C
K
High
Parallel resource abundance 
(Quadrant I)
a
Selective resource constraints in 
financial resources (Quadrant III)
c
Low
Selective resource constraints in 
human resources (Quadrant II)
b
Parallel resource constraints 
(Quadrant IV)
d
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Table III: GEE Regression Results for Firm Performance 
 
 
 
  
Intercept 0.079 *** (0.008) 0.144 *** (0.008) 0.064 *** (0.011) 0.143 *** (0.012) 0.096 *** (0.012) 0.123 *** (0.012)
Firm size -0.005 *** (0.001) -0.009 *** (0.001) -0.006 *** (0.001) -0.011 *** (0.001) -0.005 *** (0.001) -0.006 *** (0.001)
Firm age 0.002 *** (0.000) 0.002 *** (0.000) 0.004 *** (0.001) 0.004 *** (0.001) 0.001 ** (0.000) 0.001 ** (0.000)
Intangible assets ratio -0.005 (0.009) 0.006 (0.009) -0.009 (0.012) 0.000 (0.012) 0.012 (0.012) 0.020 (0.012)
Knowledge intensity -0.028 *** (0.005) -0.017 *** (0.005) -0.037 *** (0.007) -0.022 *** (0.007) -0.020 *** (0.006) -0.015 ** (0.006)
VC dummy -0.054 *** (0.006) -0.043 *** (0.006) -0.059 *** (0.007) -0.045 *** (0.007) -0.035 *** (0.008) -0.030 *** (0.008)
Potential slack -0.102 *** (0.005) -0.091 *** (0.005) -0.109 *** (0.007) -0.093 *** (0.007) -0.065 *** (0.007) -0.064 *** (0.007)
Potential slack squared -0.052 *** (0.010) -0.041 *** (0.010) -0.061 *** (0.014) -0.043 *** (0.014) -0.036 *** (0.013) -0.034 ** (0.013)
Recoverable slack 0.037 (0.040) -0.008 (0.040) 0.093 (0.061) 0.037 (0.060) 0.007 (0.047) -0.014 (0.048)
Recoverable slack squared -1.014 *** (0.199) -0.723 *** (0.198) -1.281 *** (0.302) -0.924 *** (0.299) -0.770 *** (0.239) -0.620 ** (0.240)
Lagged performance 0.522 *** (0.005) 0.476 *** (0.006) 0.560 *** (0.007) 0.509 *** (0.008) 0.521 *** (0.008) 0.496 *** (0.008)
Selective resource constraints in 
human resources (Quandrant II)
0.025 *** (0.004) 0.032 *** (0.005) 0.016 *** (0.005)
Selective resource constraints in 
financial resources (Quadrant III)
0.012 *** (0.004) 0.014 *** (0.005) 0.007 (0.004)
Parallel resource constraints 
(Quadrant IV)
0.011 *** (0.004) 0.014 *** (0.005) 0.002 (0.005)
Financial slack 0.028 *** (0.011) 0.043 *** (0.016) 0.021 (0.014)
Financial slack squared -0.049 * (0.028) -0.094 ** (0.041) 0.011 (0.037)
HR slack
 a -0.897 (0.776) -0.332 (1.066) -1.375 (1.017)
HR slack squared 
a -0.160 *** (0.013) -0.174 *** (0.017) -0.100 *** (0.020)
Financial slack x HR slack
 a -15.991 *** (1.932) -18.554 *** (2.522) -9.488 *** (3.055)
                       N (Firm-years)
                       Number of firms
                       Wald chi-square 15,173.630*** 15,814.550*** 10,814.920*** 11,428.470*** 6,394.680***
4,715 4,715 3,802 3,802 2,828
30,669 30,669 16,249 16,249 14,420
All firms New firms Later-stage firms
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
14,420
6,443.720***
2,828
a 
HR slack/100 
 
Note. Conservative two-tailed tests, where * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Sub-industry, country and year controls are included but not reported. Unstandardized regression 
coefficients are shown. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table IV: GEE Regression Results for Firm Exit 
 
 
 
 
Intercept -3.758 *** (0.187) -3.879 *** (0.194) -4.154 *** (0.266) -4.270 *** (0.274) -3.629 *** (0.291) -3.816 *** (0.301)
Firm size -0.059 *** (0.015) -0.046 *** (0.016) -0.058 *** (0.021) -0.045 ** (0.022) -0.065 *** (0.022) -0.048 ** (0.023)
Firm age -0.026 *** (0.006) -0.026 *** (0.006) -0.037 * (0.021) -0.035 * (0.021) -0.014 (0.010) -0.015 (0.010)
Intangible assets ratio 0.350 ** (0.154) 0.340 ** (0.158) 0.336 * (0.201) 0.354 * (0.207) 0.422 * (0.244) 0.382 (0.248)
Knowledge intensity -0.213 ** (0.099) -0.246 ** (0.100) -0.468 *** (0.153) -0.486 *** (0.154) 0.036 (0.125) -0.035 (0.130)
VC dummy 0.020 (0.095) -0.004 (0.095) -0.023 (0.131) -0.041 (0.131) 0.094 (0.141) 0.060 (0.142)
Potential slack -0.232 ** (0.102) -0.280 *** (0.105) -0.124 (0.139) -0.181 (0.143) -0.370 ** (0.154) -0.407 ** (0.157)
Potential slack squared 0.873 *** (0.184) 0.809 *** (0.185) 0.950 *** (0.248) 0.872 *** (0.250) 0.866 *** (0.274) 0.819 *** (0.277)
Recoverable slack -3.158 *** (0.814) -2.985 *** (0.817) -1.995 (1.239) -1.854 (1.243) -3.990 *** (1.084) -3.716 *** (1.090)
Recoverable slack squared 16.692 *** (4.019) 15.854 *** (4.034) 14.918 ** (5.944) 14.395 ** (5.964) 16.655 *** (5.540) 15.127 *** (5.574)
Lagged performance -0.637 *** (0.108) -0.536 *** (0.120) -0.549 *** (0.139) -0.525 *** (0.153) -0.839 *** (0.177) -0.605 *** (0.193)
Selective resource constraints in 
human resources (Quandrant II)
0.004 (0.082) 0.061 (0.115) -0.036 (0.118)
Selective resource constraints in 
financial resources (Quadrant III)
0.088 (0.076) 0.092 (0.106) 0.073 (0.110)
Parallel resource constraints 
(Quadrant IV)
0.286 *** (0.078) 0.310 *** (0.110) 0.270 ** (0.112)
Financial slack -0.838 *** (0.234) -0.783 ** (0.319) -0.805 ** (0.346)
Financial slack squared 1.638 *** (0.617) 1.992 ** (0.821) 0.998 (0.937)
HR slack
 a -38.494 ** (15.130) -51.015 ** (20.620) -31.013 (22.320)
HR slack squared 
a 0.720 *** (0.242) 0.682 ** (0.318) 1.088 *** (0.383)
Financial slack x HR slack
 a 65.506 * (35.637) 29.153 (44.053) 130.405 ** (61.035)
                       N (Firm-years)
                       Number of firms
                       Wald chi-square 629.880***
4,715 4,715 3,802 3,802 2,828 2,828
1,081.790*** 1,089.190*** 509.580*** 513.740*** 614.140***
All firms New firms
14,420
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
30,669 30,669 16,249 16,249 14,420
Later-stage firms
a 
HR slack/100 
 
Note. Conservative two-tailed tests, where * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Sub-industry, country and year controls are included but not reported. Unstandardized regression 
coefficients are shown. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Appendix A: Sample Description 
 
 
 
% %
Book year
1984 - 1989 754 15.99 1994 167 0.54
1990 - 1994 886 18.79 1995 358 1.17
1995 - 1999 1,537 32.59 1996 487 1.59
2000 - 2004 1,538 32.63 1997 664 2.17
Total 4,715 100.00 1998 812 2.65
Country 1999 1,193 3.89
Belgium 493 10.46 2000 1,812 5.91
Finland 527 11.18 2001 2,413 7.87
France 1,140 24.18 2002 2,790 9.10
Italy 869 18.43 2003 3,068 10.00
Spain 614 13.02 2004 3,141 10.24
UK 1,072 22.74 2005 3,190 10.40
Total 4,715 100.00 2006 3,057 9.97
2007 2,902 9.46
ICT manufacturing 1,046 22.18 2008 2,519 8.21
Telecom 299 6.34 2009 2,096 6.83
Web publishing 326 6.91 Total 30,669 100.00
Internet 411 8.72
Software 2,633 55.84
Total 4,715 100.00
Number of firm-year 
observations
Foundation period
Sub-industry
Number of firms
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Appendix B: Robustness Tests 
We fitted multiple additional models to test the robustness of our findings and assess the strength 
of alternative explanations. These models are not reported because of space considerations, but 
they are available from the authors upon request.  
First, we use alternative dependent variables. For firm performance, we use EBITDA (in 
millions of euro) not scaled by total assets. For firm survival, we construct an alternative measure 
in which we do not consider mergers and acquisitions as exits. Mergers and acquisitions not only 
involve unsuccessful firms (i.e., fire sales) but may also involve very successful firms. The 
results remain qualitatively similar with these alternative dependent variables.  
Second, we conduct additional tests to control for the possibility that slack resources may 
be endogenously determined. Following Wang et al. (2013), we apply the predicted value 
approach, which helps to separate out the endogenously determined variance in the levels of 
financial and HR slack. Specifically, we first estimate models with cash on total assets 
(employment cost on sales) as the dependent variable. These models include past performance 
(this measure is clearly exogenous to current slack levels because current slack levels do not 
determine past performance), basic firm characteristics, sub-industry dummies and year 
dummies. The difference between the actual and predicted level of resources (from the first 
models) represents resource slack and is subsequently used in the second-stage performance and 
survival regressions to reduce any biases caused by endogeneity. The results remain similar.  
Third, we test whether our results are stable across different institutional environments. 
Specifically, we make a distinction between common law countries (the UK) and civil law 
countries (Belgium, France, Italy and Spain). The size and breadth of financial markets and the 
flexibility of labor markets are fundamentally different across common law and civil law 
countries. However, we find qualitatively similar results in both environments.  
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Fourth, we test if our findings are limited to ICT firms or have broader implications for 
other technology-based firms. For this purpose, we use data from VICO on firms in other 
technology-based industries, such as biotechnology, robotics and nanotechnology, among others. 
Our results are again qualitatively similar to those reported before. 
Finally, instead of splitting the data into new and later-stage firms to test Hypothesis 3, we 
conduct GEE regressions on the total sample, including the main, squared and interaction terms 
of financial and HR slack and the two- and three-way interactions with age. This alternative 
specification leads to virtually identical results.  
